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If, like me, you tend toward indolence, then when you are presented 
with two recent books on the same topic, your first thought is "I am not 
reading both; I wonder which is better." I fear I have little succor to offer fellow 
sloths interested in the New York anti-rent movement (1839-65 or so). 
These two books are complements, not substitutes. McCurdy's Anti-Rent Era 
in New York Politics, 1839-1865 provides essential political history and ex-
pertly, lucidly dissects abstruse, dated court decisions and statutes. Huston's 
Land and Freedom: Rural Society, Popular Protest, and Party Politics in Antebel-
lum New York presents a rich, detailed social history of the same era. For 
catholic scholars interested in examining the anti-rent episode from differ-
ent perspectives, these two works cover most of the angles. This essay en-
deavors to fill one important perspective omitted by both McCurdy and 
Huston: economics. 
Eric Kades is professor of law, William and Mary Law School. I thank Bob Ellickson, 
Reeve Huston, Rich Hynes, Jim Krier, and Charles McCurdy for helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
© 2002 American Bar Foundation. 
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Neither author burdens his exposition of the complex anti-rent move-
ment with an overarching, procrustean thesis. McCurdy, indeed, explicitly 
states in his introduction that "the book does not argue a single thesis" (p. 
xvi). That said, he highlights the effect that lawyers and their culture had 
on politics, and the protean politics of New York during the anti-rent era. 
Huston emphasizes the tenants' desire to own their farms as part and parcel 
of a "free labor" ideology solidifying in the antebellum North, and the effect 
of the "market revolution" on tenant farmers. He does not, however, limit 
his discussion of the contemporary social milieu to matters tied directly to 
these theses. Both authors highlight the give-and-take between the grass-
roots anti-rent movement and the organized political parties. 
Although this essay considers the authors' major themes and theses, it 
is organized around disciplines. After presenting a nutshell history, I ex-
amine the major political, social, and economic features of the anti-rent 
movement. Finally, I highlight a couple of surprising ways in which legal 
controversies from the movement remain relevant today. 
I. HISTORY OF THE ANTI-RENT MOVEMENT 
The New York anti-rent movement, running from 1839 until after the 
Civil War, pitted large-scale landlords against their tenants in a struggle 
over lease terms that led to violence, political infighting, and judicial bat-
tles. At the core of the movement directed against New Y ark's huge ma-
norial estates along the Hudson River and in the Catskills foothills, 
unsurprisingly, was rent. Not just any rent but perpetual rent. Perpetual rent 
implies perpetual leases, and such leases truly were the root problem. 1 These 
leases went by the oxymoronic name "leases in fee," reflecting the bizarre 
combination of leasehold on one hand (periodic rent) and fee simple posses-
sion on the other (an open-ended inheritable term). Although leases in fee 
contained other features that made them appear feudal, a historian of the 
early history of the region concluded that "the landlord-tenant relationship 
was more capitalistic and modern in character than feudal" (Kim 1978, 21 ). 
Although a few landlords-or "patroons"-appear to have exercised the 
rights of a true manorial lord, such as running their own courts, these prac-
tices disappeared by the early 1700s (Kim 1978, 37, 87, 103, 107, 127, 234). 
Thus, it was not their feudal nature of the leases that perplexed contempo-
rary laymen, lawyers, judges, and legislators; it was the combination of a fee 
simple term with tenancy-for-years payments. 
1. In addition to tenants with perpetual leaseholds, many tenants with two- and three-
life leases participated in the anti-rent movement. Their disputes with their landlords were 
similar to those of perpetual tenants, though on some issues their interests differed. Some 
tenants had more conventional term-of-year leases. 
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There are no pat answer to the first set of obvious questions that come 
to mind: Why did colonial governments grant such huge tracts of land to a 
handful of owners? Why did landlords in the Hudson Valley select the lease 
in fee instead of the common alternatives? Why did tenants agree to leases 
in fee? 
The government's motivation for making such large grants included 
venality, but also the belief that large, wealthy grandees could develop and 
populate the region efficiently. As time went on, however, a number of 
colonial governors and other leaders resisted the policy, fearing that the 
patroons retarded development by refusing to sell fee simple ownership 
(Kim 1978, 78, 129). 
The landlords' reasons for selecting the lease in fee are difficult to 
plumb. Some patroons had failed to attract tenants with short-term leases, 
and may have turned to the lease in fee as a compromise with tenants desir-
ing fee simple ownership. McCurdy describes the appeal of the lease in fee 
to landlords: 
Owning a share of the Hudson Valley manor or patent was a rentier 
dream. The tenants absorbed all maintenance costs and paid any taxes; 
the [fees due on sale] tended to forestall turnover and provided land-
lords with a bounty when conveyances did occur. Although no invest-
ment of labor or [fresh] capital was required, trust and estate lawyers in 
Manhattan or Albany mailed a fat check every year. (P. 93) 
This story requires additional assumptions, as the patroons could have 
obtained work-free income, and with much less trouble, by selling the land 
in fee simple and investing the proceeds in stocks, bonds, or other liquid 
assets. Perhaps, however, we are too hasty to assume that such investments 
existed in the late 1700s and early 1800s. The relative dearth of investment-
grade stocks and bonds may have made land look like the most attractive 
option for risk-averse investors, and may have made diversification expen-
sive or impossible. 
Finally, why did tenants settle for leases in fee when the federal gov-
ernment and many private landholders were selling fee simple title to wide 
swaths of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Georgia, Alabama, and other states? 
The most likely answer seems to be lack of cash for a down payment, and a 
similar need for more than a few years to pay off a mortgage. Mortgages were 
rare, and when available the terms were short-nothing approaching to-
day's 30-year mortgages existed until the twentieth century. The federal 
government either offered no financing or required full payment within 
three years. For a typical quarter section ( 640 acres, selling at the statutory 
minimum $2/acre), this required either $1,280 up front, or the same 
amount, with interest, in three years. The federal government rarely sold 
parcels smaller than a quarter section. 
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The patroons sold 100-acre lots and required down payments of only 
$25-$100. In addition, the manorial landlords typically waived rent for the 
first seven years, giving tenants a chance to clear land and start generating 
income. Thereafter, annual rent and services due included about 14 bushels 
of wheat per 100 acres, four fowl, and one day's labor with a horse and cart. 
The sum total of these "services" averaged around $20. 
Plugging these terms into the usual present-value formulas, we can esti-
mate the implied price of land once we supply an interest rate. Presumably 
these farmers were relatively high-risk borrowers, and so the discount rate 
must be significantly higher than the risk-free rate of about 2-4% during 
the first half of the nineteenth century (Great Britain Open Market Rates 
of Discount 1824-1939, 1824-60). If we assume an interest rate of 5%, this 
would imply tenants paid about $4.50 an acre; under this assumption, the 
leases might appear exploitative, given the prevailing price of $2/acre for 
many acres of federal land. If we discount at 10%, however, the implied per 
acre price of land comes to about $2.15, in line with the fee sales. And 
applying a discount rate of 15%-not outlandish given the riskiness of lend-
ing to poorer farmers-implies a per-acre price of about $1.50, making the 
lease in fee look like a bargain. 
Other terms of the lease in fee complicate valuation. Landlords did 
provide substantial public goods, such as schools (buildings and teachers) 
and churches; accounting for these lowers effective rents charged. On the 
other hand, the lease indentures required tenants to pay fees if they sold 
their farms to strangers; most commonly, so-called quarter sale provisions 
entitled landlords to one-quarter of the sale price. This raised effective rents 
substantially. Tenants found these particularly objectionable, since the 
greater part of the sales price reflected improvements that the tenant had 
made in the form of homes, barns, and cleared land. 
Whatever the parties' motivations, from the 1790s until 1819 the ma-
norial estates along the upper Hudson attracted large numbers of new set-
tlers, both immigrants to America and emigrants from overcrowded New 
England. The Panic of 1819 squeezed Stephen Van Rensselaer III (owner of 
the largest manorial estate) and the other landlords, who had let many te-
nants accumulate significant rent arrears. Feeling the pinch, Van Rensselaer 
for the first time in his long life filed suits to collect the back rents. He and 
the other landlords also renewed efforts to enforce timber and mill rights. 
The timing could hardly have been worse for tenants. The Erie Canal 
and other internal improvements brought a flood of competing western farm 
products. Furthermore, many early tenants had exhausted the land and 
could no longer raise wheat. This, combined with wheat's rising price, made 
rent obligations (denominated largely in bushels of wheat) more onerous. 
Huston points out that hill farmers suffered the most under these adverse 
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economic developments: They were poorer than the more established valley 
farmers, and farther from markets. 
Despite stalemated attempts to collect back rents, Van Rensselaer to 
some extent maintained his reputation for benevolence among the tenants. 
Some expected that on his death, he would forgive all past-due rent. His 
will, however, sorely disappointed tenants: It forgave nothing. Further, 
neither of his legatees (Stephen Van Rensselaer IV received his father's 
lands on the west bank of the Hudson; William Van Rensselaer, the lands 
on the east bank) showed the slightest inclination to cancel any tenant 
debts. 
Lawsuits against tenants filed by Stephen Van Rensselaer IV in 1839 
were the spark that ignited the anti-rent conflagration. Stephen had refused 
to deal with the tenants as a group, dismissing their representatives from his 
manor without a word. The first sign of fire was a tenant rally held in Bern, 
New York, on July 4, 1839. Tenant anger quickly grew, and focused on their 
landlords' jugular: They wanted to prove that the titles of the Van Rensse-
laers and other landlords were fatally flawed. Such title challenges, and ten-
ant uprisings, were not entirely novel. Yet earlier uprisings, during the mid-
i 700s, largely had been fomented by rivalry between colonies (Massachu-
setts and New York boundary disputes), or between neighboring landown-
ers. In 1839, however, the tenants were not the pawns of rival landlords 
(Kim 1978, chaps. 7, 8). 
Anti-renters organized their efforts around three groups. First and fore-
most, they formed anti-rent associations on each manor. These associations 
organized rent strikes and assessed fees to finance litigation and lobbying. 
At their height, the associations may have included up to a quarter of the 
260,000 Hudson Valley tenants. They did not limit membership to farmers; 
many lawyers, doctors, and small businessmen joined as well. Second, anti-
renters eventually formed a political party that elected a number of state 
legislators, sometimes in alliance with the major parties, sometimes on its 
own. Finally, and most famously, militant anti-renters (largely younger, 
poorer landless men) organized a vigilante force dubbed the Indians. This 
label is a bit obscure, as members did not dress up as Indians, but rather 
donned the somewhat bizarre disguise of (1) calico dresses and (2) bulky, 
tall leather bag-shaped face masks. The use of such getups and the name 
Indians were not novel; tenants had adopted both almost a century earlier, 
in the uprisings driven by feuding landlords (Kim 1978, 330, 402). Indians 
first appeared in 1841, and by 1845 claimed 10,000 members. Although the 
associations and the party maintained a careful distance from the Indians, 
there was significant overlap in membership and tacit support, at least until 
Indian activities resulted in deaths. 
Even before the Indians appeared, tenants quickly went from passively 
resisting service of legal process to active use of force. In the first round of 
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clashes, the so-called Helderberg War, in the fall and winter of 1839, they 
tarred and feathered, and kidnapped deputy sheriffs trying to serve process. 
Governor Seward eventually called out the militia, and the tenants re-
lented. To the shock and dismay of the landlords, however, Seward ex-
pressed sympathy for the tenants' situation and declared that the 
government should find a way to help them. This set a pattern of mixed 
messages that continued throughout the anti-rent era. The state govern-
ment acted relatively decisively to quell active resistance to the rule of law, 
but it simultaneously expressed sympathy for the tenants' "plight" and 
searched for ameliorative legal measures. 
Despite these efforts, anti-rent activities resulted in three deaths from 
1844 to 1845. The first was benign: A stray bullet fired during Indian ma-
neuvers killed an innocent bystander. The next two were uglier. The Indi-
ans killed a tenant who signed a lumber lease with William Van Rensselaer 
as the tenant attempted to haul away some logs. Signing such a lease, which 
recognized the landlord's title, was antithetical to the tenants' burning de-
sire to prove these titles void. The final death was even more menacing: 
Indians shot Undersheriff Osman Steele while he was selling a tenant's ani-
mals to satisfy a debt owed the landlord. Governor Wright declared the 
county in insurrection and sent in the militia; the town of Delhi, New York, 
became an armed camp for months. 
These deaths, especially the final murder of a law enforcement official 
performing his duty, swung public opinion heavily against the Indians. The 
militia made scores of arrests, although in the end there were no executions, 
and two Indians found guilty of felony murder were granted clemency. 
Smith Boughton, one leader of the Indians, remained in prison under 
trumped-up charges of highway robbery, but he too eventually received 
clemency. The legislature passed a number of anti-Indian laws, including a 
statute criminalizing the act of being both armed and disguised in public. 
Even with this decisive defeat of the Indians, sheriffs continued to have 
severe difficulties serving process on debtor tenants, as neighbors would 
blow tin horns on the approach of a deputy, and the targeted family would 
hide with neighbors until the deputy departed. 
The associations, despairing that their rent strikes would force land-
lords to sell out cheap, and realizing that illegal acts were unacceptable to 
most voters, increasingly focused their efforts on judicial and legislative 
remedies. Neither the Democrats nor the Whigs (the major parties during 
this era) made a natural fit for the anti-renters, as each had a significant 
wing opposed to any erosion of vested property rights. Frustration with both 
eventually led to the formation of the Anti-Rent Party. 
The tenants had some notable judicial and legislative successes. The 
courts abolished all fines on alienation (quarter sales and similar fees due 
landlords on each sale) as inconsistent with the tenant's quasi-fee interest. 
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The legislature heeded the tenants' request to tax ground rents; before this 
measure, New York had taxed improvements on property but not the value 
of the soil itself (precisely the opposite of Henry George's famous exhorta· 
tion to tax the ground and only the ground) (George 1879). Finally, the 
tenants obtained legislation abolishing the landlords' remedy of distraint-
selling a tenant's chattels at a sheriffs sale to satisfy a debt judgment. 
Although these measures placed significant pressure on landlords to 
settle, neither alone nor together did they provide tenants a comprehensive 
remedy. One of the earliest and most creative suggested solutions was for 
the state to give tenants a private power of condemnation, authorizing them 
to force landlords to sell their reversionary rights at a judicially determined 
fair market price. Tenants were not enamored with this solution, as it might 
have proven costly. Combined with poor political strategy, this lukewarm 
tenant support explains the failure to authorize a condemnation measure in 
the New York Constitution of 1846. 
In 1844, Martin Van Buren suggested that New York bar the inherita-
bility of the landlord's right of entry. Few seemed to doubt that this was 
constitutional, under the English view that the ability to pass property at 
death was created by, and revisable by, the state; there was no natural right 
to inherit (McCurdy p. 160, citing Blackstone 1832, 2:12). Further, there 
was an American precedent for abolishing the right to leave property on 
death: the abolition of entails by every state in the early Republic (Katz 
1977). Tenants were not entirely satisfied with this measure, as they would 
continue to owe rents until the landlords, some of whom were young or 
middle-aged, died. Although proposed by Governor Wright in 1845, it fell 
victim to partisan maneuvering, and never reappeared. 
The last major tenant legal maneuver that failed was a siren song: chal-
lenging the legitimacy of each landlord's title. It was the preferred remedy of 
tenants because, they believed, disproving their landlords' titles would vest 
title in them-without payment of even one cent. The landlords' titles 
were, undoubtedly, far from pristine. Some had laid claim to lands vastly 
exceeding the delineations of their deeds; others had failed to purchase the 
interests of co-owners; and still others had failed to fulfill requirements to 
attract a minimum number of settlers within a fixed time fra:me. The tenant 
uprisings of the 1700s, driven by conflicting claims among landlords and 
colonies, repeatedly had aired the flaws in titles to the manorial estates. Yet, 
as a legislative report noted, many if not most land titles in New York had 
similar imperfections. If the tenants succeeded in their title challenges, no 
land title in New York would be secure. Many anti-rent leaders, and more 
astute lawyers, realized that tenants who challenged the title of someone 
they had acknowledged as their landlord (discussed below) faced insur-
mountable doctrinal obstacles. Perhaps their leaders failed the tenants by 
pursuing this remedy despite the improbability of success. In the end, the 
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courts completely and unambiguously rejected all tenant challenges to the 
landlords' titles. 
Although the landlords won this important battle, they did not win 
the war. The partial tenant victories summarized above, along with the fi-
nancial and psychic costs of continual conflict, drove most landlords to 
reach settlements with tenants during the late 1840s and into the early 
1850s. Huston's meticulous research demonstrates that on some estates as 
many as 75% of the tenants reached terms and bought out their landlord. 
John King, landlord of Blenheim Hill, sold out to his tenants en masse, 
placing the onus on the tenants to collect payments from all their members. 
Many tenants who did not buy out their landlords emigrated. The Van Ren-
sselaers and a few other landlords, however, never settled with a significant 
number of their tenants. Both Stephen IV and William sold their interests 
to WalterS. Church, for 60% and 40% of face value respectively. Church 
evicted numerous tenants, including refractory ideologues who surrendered 
fine homes and farms worth thousands rather than pay rent or Church's 
price for full title. Despite these successes, Church himself went bankrupt 
shortly after the Civil War as a result of the expensive process of evicting 
recalcitrant tenants. A few tenants continued to honor their leases in fee, 
and as late as 1884, at least 300 such leases remained in existence. 
Less pig-headed landlords and tenants split the difference. Those who 
refused to settle for anything less than complete triumph, whether tenant or 
landlord, ended up big losers. The outcome was reminiscent of a favorite 
aphorism on Wall Street: "Bulls make money, bears make money, pigs get 
slaughtered." 
II. POLITICAL ISSUES 
The great, paradoxical tragedy of the anti-rent movement was the 
nearly universal admission that the manorial leases were socially perni-
cious-economically undesirable and inconsistent with the personal inde-
pendence that was a prerequisite to prized republican virtue. Yet the 
legislature, and even the people of New York, in the 1846 constitutional 
convention, never crafted an effective, general solution. McCurdy focuses 
on the politics of the anti-rent era and documents the long series of political 
failures. In addition, as his title indicates, he examines other political issues 
brewing in New York during the anti-rent years. 
Given the heated rivalry between the Democrats and the Whigs, the 
anti-rent tenants increasingly came to hold the balance of power. This 
seems an ideal position for a special-interest group. For reasons traced in 
detail by McCurdy, however, the party out of power, by attracting sufficient 
defectors from the majority, consistently managed to sabotage anti-rent leg-
islation. The motive was always partisan: "As the Anti-Rent Party grew 
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larger, political credit for extinguishing manorial tenures became a kind of 
public good that neither major party wanted the other to appropriate" (Mc-
Curdy, p. 333 ). Thus the Democrats killed a Whig eminent domain bill that 
would have given tenants the power to force landlords to sell out at a price 
determined by the courts. The Whigs, when in the minority, managed to 
help sink a Democratic bill implementing Van Buren's scheme to declare 
landlords' interest in the lease in fee uninheritable. As is so common with 
politics, the devil is in the details. The Democrats' anti-inheritability bill 
failed in large part because the Whigs exploited a split among the Demo-
crats over the choice of the state printer! Through a string of such exam-
ples, McCurdy recounts the endless difficulties that the Anti-Rent Party 
faced trying to pass legislation inevitably opposed by one of the major 
parties. 
McCurdy also demonstrates the ineffectiveness of attempts by more 
radical groups to use the anti-rent tenants as one component of a broad 
lower-class coalition of urban workers and other poorer rural farmers . 
George Henry Evans and his National Reform Association made only mod-
erate headway in selling anti-renters on an inalienable, fundamental, natu-
ral right to enough land, owned in fee simple, for familial sustenance. 
Thomas Devyr, a colorful radical with a long history of populist advocacy in 
Great Britain and then in America, and editor of the leading anti-rent 
newspaper, The Freeholder, was extremely popular among the tenants but 
never convinced enough of them to look beyond the confines of their local 
dispute. 
To flip Tip O'Neal's adage that "all politics is local," McCurdy master-
fully demonstrates how national politics repeatedly had a significant impact 
on the anti-rent struggle. The Panic of 1837 made Whigs everywhere re-
treat from their usually expansive plans for government-sponsored improve-
ments. In New York, it also dashed any notion that the state might pay the 
landlords to cede their reversionary interests to the tenants. At other times, 
national politics helped the anti-renters. The annexation of Texas in 1845 
was popular with Democrats elsewhere, especially in the South, but was 
intensely unpopular among New York Democrats. Thus, a weakened Demo-
cratic Party that had taken a hard anti-tenant line felt compelled to soften 
its position in order to obtain much-needed votes. Finally, it is no surprise 
that the slavery issue affected New York politics during this era. To take but 
one example, it so badly fractured the Democrats in 1848 that the Whigs 
felt little need to court the anti-rent vote. 
For those interested in New York's protean political landscape during 
this period, such as the intra-party politics between Bucktails, Bambumers, 
and Hunkers, McCurdy's book is invaluable. He debunks the widespread 
belief that anti-renters were the moving force behind New York's constitu-
tional convention in 1846 and the resulting constitution. His detailed anal-
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ysis of voting patterns reveals that party loyalties, rather the anti-rent 
politics, explain support for the convention. As further evidence, he shows 
that the anti-rent forces never developed a plan to obtain relief in the new 
constitution; their failure even to suggest a clause authorizing tenants to 
condemn their landlords' interest shows that the anti-renters' attention re-
mained focused elsewhere (e.g., on title challenges, which required no con-
stitutional amendment). In the end, contemporaneous tenants received no 
relief at all from the New York Constitution of 1846: As to matters of lease-
holds, it operated only prospectively (abolishing feudal tenures and declar-
ing all lands held allodially; barring agricultural leases for more than 12 
years; invalidating fines on alienation). Those without a primary interest in 
New York politics may want to skim parts of this discussion, as McCurdy 
covers this episode in great detail. 
Huston's political analysis, in keeping with the rest of the book, tends 
to focus on concrete social relations. For example, he documents the te-
nants' traditional voting loyalty to their landlords, and the process by which 
this loyalty disappeared. Landlords reminded tenants around election day of 
any back rents due, and distributed ballots marked for the landlord or his 
candidate. In order to circumvent the secret ballot, they asked tenants to 
fold their ballots in a particular manner. Stephen Van Rensselaer III (or his 
designated candidate) routinely received around 90% of the votes of tenants 
on the manors, but only 50% to 65% of other votes. This pattern, changed 
with the arrival of large-scale partisan politicking, and professional politi-
cians in the 1820s and 1830s, in turn formed much of the basis for the anti-
rent movement. 
III. SOCIOLOGICAL ISSUES 
In addition to this political split, Huston highlights a growing fracture 
in social relations. To use his wonderful label, landlords attached great im-
portance to the "theatre of benevolence and deference" between landlords 
and tenants. Landlords seemed to have reaped significant psychic pleasure 
from their elevated social position. The deference they received, however, 
was paper-thin. For tenants, as both Huston and McCurdy note, it was the 
price paid for benevolence-for example, forbearance in collecting back 
rent. As soon as the landlords began pressuring tenants for payment and 
filing lawsuits, tenants' obeisance evaporated. 
As the landlords' influence faded with their wealth, Huston traces the 
fascinating process by which they placed increasing emphasis on "breeding," 
manners, and education-dimensions in which, at least in their view, they 
remained distinguishable from and superior to others. Additionally, inter-
marriage among the landed families increased markedly during these "troub-
ling" times. James Fenimore Cooper, a son of the aristocracy, wrote a little-
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read trilogy, The Littlepage Manuscripts, that reflects all these themes: The 
aristocratic hero marries the daughter of another landowner, defeats the 
bad-faith attempt of upstarts to seize his lands, with the heavy-handed em-
phasis throughout on the social merits of the upper crust.2 
Huston explores in even greater detail the social milieu of the tenants 
and the elements of their world that shaped the anti-rent movement. A 
particular strength of his analysis is that he asks profound questions that are 
obvious only after you hear them raised. For example, on what experiences 
did the tenants, simple farmers, draw in order to organize a mass social 
movement? Huston makes a strong case that the tenants borrowed many 
tools acquired in the ongoing temperance movement, which had broad and 
deep support in the area. From the temperance movement they had learned 
how to use newspaper ads; how to organize, publicize, and run rallies, pole 
raisings, and other mass meetings; how to educate their cohorts; how to 
monitor compliance with group norms; and how to shame violators of those 
norms. 
Similarly, Huston traces elements of tenant culture that laid a founda-
tion for the very idea of the Indians and their forceful assertion of commu-
nity norms. Tenant communities had a loosely related class of activities, 
under the label of "charivari" or "skimeton," "ritualized methods of enforc-
ing community standards and morality" (Huston p. 118, quoting Palmer 
1978). For example, violators of sexual or marital norms suffered visits by 
intimidating crews of young men who serenaded them with cacophonous 
music (kettles or cow bells, e.g.), destroyed their target's personal property, 
and sometimes matters progressed (regressed?) to assault and battery. 
Skimetons were not always so menacing; newlyweds received a light-
hearted version designed to extract a round of drinks from the groom. Par-
ticipants often wore costumes and masks to disguise themselves. Huston 
documents some reasons tenants selected Indians as their facade. The sav-
age imagery of Indians was certainly part of the attraction, but Huston ar-
gues that tenants also invoked the ideal of the noble savage as a 
counterpoint to the corruption of their landlords. One story spun was that 
the Indians truly were Indian-the ancestors of the aboriginal occupants-
and were returning to reestablish their title against the landlords' fatally 
flawed claims. Once they had done so, as noble savages they would gift the 
land to the tenants who had cleared the land, planted the crops, and built 
the homes and barns. Huston notes that younger, poorer men served as In-
dians because it gave them a rare chance to exercise power and gain respect 
in their communities. 
2. The Littlepage trilogy consists of Satansroe (1845), The Chainbearer (1845), and The 
Redskins (1846) . This trilogy is out of print for good reason; only those with a particular taste 
for the worldview of a smug aristocrat could possibly enjoy it. Apparently and unfortunately, 
keeping one's word is not an aristocratic trait, as Cooper vowed in A Letter to His Countrymen 
(1834) never to write again. 
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The Indians were unrepresentative of the anti-rent movement: Huston 
demonstrates that it was, in the main, rooted in the dissatisfaction of mid-
dle-class farmers. The movement offered nothing for the poorest segment of 
society, the landless. Indeed, many tenants owned timberlands and worried 
about the poor stealing their trees. More generally, Huston documents mid-
dle-class tenants' worries that their poorer neighbors were wasting common 
lands (lands still owned by the landlord, but that tenants used, legally or 
otherwise) by overgrazing and removing moss and other forest products. 
On all these sociological topics, Huston has done an incredible amount 
of grunt work in archives of original sources. Just to give a few examples, he 
examined all public records left by the employees of one large farm over a 
25-year period; many newspapers, meeting journals, and minutes; volumi-
nous election records; and land records (Huston pp. 40, 54, chap. 2, nn.l3, 
29, 32, 40, 52-64 ). 
Readers may take pause at Huston's assertions that "anti-renters helped 
destroy an entire system of property and labor" and that the anti-rent move-
ment was an integral part of a "free labor" movement in the antebellum 
North. The first hurdle is semantic: The word labor and the phrase free labor 
obviously cannot refer to landlord-tenant relations on the great New Y ark 
manors, as there simply were no labor relations between the tenants and 
landlords. Although couched in feudal terms, leases in fee created no ele-
ments of a lord-vassal relation in practice. On their face such leases might 
have looked like share-cropping agreements because tenants owed rent in 
wheat and fowl, but in practice, these obligations had long been reduced to 
a cash equivalent. Landlords had absolutely no say in what crops their te-
nants raised or how they raised them. The parties had a very troubled prop-
erty relationship, but that was it. 
Huston, however, uses labor more as a synonym for class relations (the 
propertied class versus mere tenants). Following Foner (1970) and others, 
by a free labor ideology, he means a belief that all men should be indepen-
dent economic agents in an economy that fosters mobility and "the dignity 
of labor." Under these definitions, we can make sense of Huston's assertion 
that the anti-rent movement destroyed a "property and labor" system: Land 
tenure in the region did change from the anomalous lease in fee to title in 
fee simple. Although this sounds like the quintessential example of a pure 
property issue, property rights in large part define class relations. 
Huston's assertion that the anti-rent movement was part of a broader 
free labor movement that culminated in the abolition of slavery rests largely 
on political correlations: Anti-rent leaders of both the Whigs and the Dem-
ocrats went on to form the core of the anti-slavery Republican Party; many 
of these leaders also championed the Homestead Act; and anti-rent towns 
voted heavily Republican in the pivotal 1860 election. Correlation is not. 
causation, however, and Huston does not present strong ideological or so-
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cial evidence that the anti-rent movement was an important step along the 
path to abolition. 
McCurdy along with Huston documents the legal profession's strong 
social norms in favor of protecting property rights. "Training and experience 
inclined them to take seriously the constitutional constraints that Anti-
Rent leaders assailed as mere landlord talismans" (McCurdy p. 335) . In the 
courts and even to a large extent in the legislature, both authors argue that 
tenant demands were "mediated" through lawyers whose internalized legal-
social norms-in particular, deep-seated respect for property rights-served 
as a real limitation on the types of relief available to the tenants. There is, 
however, substantial counterevidence. Although lawyers may have been pe-
culiarly staunch believers in vested property rights, these views more likely 
reflected widely held notions. There was not much of a separate "legal cul-
ture" during this age: only a handful of tiny law schools and no large firms 
existed, and many lawyers had no colleagues within close proximity. Law-
yers' norms, it thus seems, must have come from broader elements of society. 
Thus, the legal profession's view of constitutional property protections prob-
ably reflected widely held sentiments. Neither Huston nor McCurdy makes 
a compelling case that the tenant lawyers' mind-sets prevented them from 
being effective advocates. As long as a significant portion of potential jurors 
and voters believed in property rights, it was sound strategy for litigating 
and lobbying lawyers to diffuse the more radical viewpoints of some anti-
renters. 
IV. LEGAL ISSUES 
The Contract Clause of the federal Constitution and the public use 
requirement of the New York State constitutions (of 1822 and of 1846) 
embodied the norms that circumscribed the forms of tenant relief accept-
able to attorneys of all stripes. The Contract Clause limited a state's ability 
to pass legislation that altered existing contracts. Applied literally, existing 
contracts would have been immune to legislative alteration, but the Su-
preme Court did not read the clause so broadly. State legislatures could 
modify remedies, but not rights. For example, the widespread abolition of 
imprisonment for debt applied retrospectively (to existing contracts), as im-
prisonment was a remedy provided by the state, not a right contained in 
contracts. Thus the tenants secured constitutionally valid legislation abol-
ishing distraint. The tenants also dearly wanted to abolish the landlord's 
remedy of ejectment for nonpayment of rent; this would have made eviction 
of tenants impossible, and limited landlords to suing for damages (with no 
ability to seize the tenancy once they obtained a judgment!). In 1843, how-
ever, the Supreme Court in Bronson v. Kinzie struck down an Illinois statute 
setting a minimum price at foreclosure sales and giving tenants a statutory 
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right to repurchase the property for one year after foreclosure. This prece-
dent made it clear that the more drastic step of extinguishing the right to 
eject breaching tenants would violate the contract clause. 
At the time of the anti-rent movement, the Bill of Rights in the na-
tional Constitution did not apply against the state, and thus the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was no obstacle to legislation expanding 
tenants' rights at the expense of their landlords. The New York Constitu-
tion, however (like those of most other states), contained a similar Takings 
Clause. Under the "public use" requirement of takings law, New York could 
exercise its condemnation power only for a public purpose. This require-
ment seemingly barred any attempt to force landlords to sell their rights to 
tenants, since the tenants did not seem to be a broad enough group to qual-
ify as the "public." 
William Duer, a young Whig star, rejected this reading of the public 
use requirement. Less than a year into the anti-rent movement, in 1840, he 
proposed legislation authorizing tenants, at their own option and expense, 
to force landlords to sell out at a price determined by the courts. He argued 
that these transactions qualified as a public use because the entire polity 
would benefit from a landownership regime that encouraged productivity 
and channeled land into the hands of those best able to use it. Duer sup-
plied a colorful analogy employing temperance legislation: If the leases in 
fee had required tenants annually to deliver, for example, a gallon of hard 
cider to their landlords, and then the legislature outlawed the production, 
transfer, or consumption of alcohol, the leases could not stand in the way of 
this exercise of the police power. Duer maintained that landlords in such a 
case would have to settle for the monetary equivalent of the gallon of cider, 
just as his bill forced them to exchange their realty interest for cash. 
The first blow to Duer's condemnation scheme came in Taylor v. 
Porter, an 1843 case striking down a New York statute authorizing owners of 
landlocked parcels to condemn roads across a neighbor's land to reach a 
public street. The New York Constitution of 1846 specifically reversed the 
outcome of Taylor and authorized a private power of condemnation for 
roads. This clause was written quite specifically, and the anti-rent leaders 
apparently made little attempt to broaden its language to legitimate Duer's 
scheme. Predictably, the New York Court of Appeals soon held in Gilbert v. 
Foote (1848) that the clause, by mentioning roads and omitting everything 
else, barred any other use of the condemnation power for subsets of the 
population. 
These constitutional issues were child's play compared to the obscure 
and abstruse property law issues litigated in the course of the anti-rent 
movement. McCurdy does a splendid job of lucidly explaining the arcana of 
cases that, in trying to make sense of the lease in fee, included everything 
from medieval English statutes to the law of covenants that run with the 
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land. Few scholars possess both the legal and the historical knowledge nec-
essary to decipher antebellum real property law so clearly. 
Tenants hoped to abrogate their landlords' title by application of the 
medieval English Statute Quia Emptores (1290), which barred lords at any 
level of the feudal hierarchy from carving out new feudal tenancies from 
their holdings (so-called subinfeudation). Quia Emptores did not bar simple 
sublets or assignments, but rather the creation of new lord-vassal relation-
ships and the attendant new layer of feudal obligations. One signature fea-
ture of subinfeudation had been that the newly minted sublord could hold 
his own manorial court. This had been illegal in England since 1290. The 
anti-rent tenants argued that since most of the Hudson Valley landlords' 
grants contained an explicit clause authorizing the operation of a manorial 
court, their interests violated the Statute Quia Emptores and therefore were 
void. This view had two problems. First, it appears likely that the statute did 
not become a part of New York law until an act of 1787-long after the 
Crown had made or affirmed the manorial grants. Second, the clauses of the 
landlords' deeds, under common canons of construction, were severable, 
and so the illegality of one clause (e.g., on the creation of manors) did not 
invalidate the rest of the deed (e.g., the naked grant of the soil). 
The tenants made more headway attacking the quarter rents and simi-
lar fees owed their landlords on the sale of their farms. The common law of 
England, long hostile to such restraints on alienation, had limited the valid-
ity of such transfer fees to landlord-tenant relations; the law deemed such 
assessments on sale inconsistent with fee ownership. In two cases decided 
relatively late in the anti-rent movement (1850), the New York Court of 
Appeals reversed a 30-year-old precedent and found that the lease in fee 
gave tenants a fee interest, not a "mere" tenancy. The court so argued be-
cause the landlord's interest, a right of re-entry (on breach of some condi-
tion in the lease), at the time was deemed not significant enough to amount 
to a real property interest. If the landlord had nothing in the eyes of the 
land law, the courts reasoned that the tenants must have close to every-
thing-a fee interest of some sort, if not a fee simple. Critically for the 
tenants, the court declared the fees on alienation void ab initio, and hence 
the cases applied retroactively to all leases extant (Overbaugh v. Patrie 1852; 
De Peyster v. Michael 1852). 
The theory behind the cases abolishing alienation fees retroactively 
seemed to offer the tenants a second and decisive victory. The landlords' 
grounds for collecting rent from tenants was not contractual, as most te-
nants had inherited or purchased their holding and so had no privity with 
the landlord. Rather, landlords relied on the legal notion that their rights 
under the original lease "ran with the land"-that is, applied to successive 
possessors of the premise. Under English precedents in this obscure area, 
followed in most if not all states, covenants could only run if the original 
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transfer was a leasehold; English law did not permit running covenants 
when the transferee took a fee interest. 
The tenants' conclusion then seemed irresistible: 
a. the courts had declared the tenants' interest a fee in abolishing fines 
on alienation, 
b. covenants could not run to the owner of a fee interest, ergo 
c. the landlords had no legal grounds to collect rent. 
The landlords, however, had a surprising ace up their sleeve: covenants 
that could not run at law could nonetheless run in equity. Two decisions 
elaborating this theory in 1859 put an end to the tenants' search for a vic-
tory in the courts (Van Rensselaer v. Hays 1859; Van Rensselaer v. Ball 
1859).3 
As a matter of doctrine, the tenants' preferred judicial remedy, disprov-
ing the landlords' titles, appears to have been futile. The problem was sim-
ple: Even if a landlord's title was wholly defective, how would that help his 
tenants? One zealous advocate for the tenants maintained that the tenants 
would then have title by adverse possession. The key assumption is that any 
attempt by the landlords to assert adverse possession would fail for lack of 
actual occupation and use. This assertion is dubious. If L enters land he does 
not own for a day, and then leases it to T , it is L who satisfies the funda-
mental requirement of adverse possession: behaving like a true owner. T, by 
paying rent, concedes L's title. Thus Samuel Tilden correctly argued that 
the "very idea of an adverse possession is of a possession claimed to be in the 
occupant's own right, and adverse to every other right .... A submission to 
another title, whether by entering the land under a grantor's indenture or 
paying any rent at all, destroys its character and effect" (McCurdy p. 255). 
Despite McCurdy's clear and comprehensive explication of the litiga-
tion between landlords and tenants, a couple of legal puzzles remain. The 
cases do not mention any statute of limitations for the collection of back 
rent; was there any such statute? If so, why didn't the tenants assert it? It 
appears that tenants holding a lease in fee could sublet the premises. If so, 
did any of them try to circumvent the fee due on sale by the standard trick 
of subletting for 99 or 999 years? In a more practical vein, what prevented 
tenants from vastly understating the sale price to minimize the alienation 
fee? How would a landlord ever have known? 
3. Interestingly, neither decision cited the key English precedent that supposedly created 
from whole cloth the rule that covenants ineligible to run at law could run in equity, Tulk v. 
Moxhay (1848) . These New York cases, written after Tulk but not citing it, and relying on 
earlier precedents, suggest that Tulk was less groundbreaking than is commonly believed. 
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V. ECONOMIC ISSUES 
These legal questions left unanswered are of secondary importance. 
The same cannot be said for the unaddressed economic issues. Although 
both authors note the impact that business cycles had on each side, they 
otherwise offer almost no economic analysis of the anti-rent struggle. This is 
a bit puzzling, as it was, on its face, a fight over money. No doubt much of 
this fight played out in the political and judicial arenas on which McCurdy 
concentrates, and the sociology of the two antagonizing communities as de-
scribed by Huston shaped the movement in part. Yet the root of the matter 
was economic: Tenants did not want themselves and their heirs/assigns to 
pay rent forever. 
Economic thinking is a sort of Occam's razor, providing simple expla-
nations for phenomena portrayed as subtle. For instance, Huston argues that 
the tenants experienced a complex cognitive dissonance: On the one hand 
they argued for the erosion of their landlord's property rights, but on the 
other hand, they stoutly defended their own rights against the landless. He 
describes this as a "dualistic class identity and Janus-faced political presence 
among farmers," and seems to castigate them for hypocrisy (pp. 208-9). Ec-
onomics suggests, simply, that the tenants (and presumably the landlords, 
and the landless) acted in their self-interest, with little if any concern for 
ideological consistency.4 
Both authors do quote contemporary descriptions of the basic eco-
nomic problems with long-term leaseholds: Tenants and landlords have less 
incentive to improve the land, and tenants cannot borrow against the land 
on a secured basis (or at least they cannot borrow on the same terms as a fee 
owner). More perceptive landlords and observers had noted these problems 
beginning in the 1700s. Horace Greeley, writing in 1845, declared that the 
lease in fee "stifled incentives to improve the farms," including the con-
struction of "poor shacks," and encouraged "bad husbandry." William 
Seward drew similar conclusions. Samuel Young, a radical Democrat said 
that the warped incentives created by the lease in fee were so powerful that 
"in riding through a tract of the country thus held, I can mark the difference 
between its appearance and where the cultivator is the independent lord of 
the soil" (Kim 1978, 185; McCurdy pp. 33, 37, 224-25; Huston pp. 141-42; 
Cheung 1975). 
It would seem that tenants and landlords could solve all these problems 
with the right combination of cooperation and greed. If they could produce 
greater wealth by getting together to agree on optimal improvements, and 
by cosigning mortgages to obtain financing where necessary, all that would 
4. Huston repeatedly notes that sexism and racism (against African Americans and Indi-
ans) was omnipresent among the tenants, demonstrating that any free labor ideology motivat-
ing them was far from universal. 
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remain would be to divide up the additional wealth that their cooperation 
had just created. This is a simple application of the Coase Theorem (Coase 
1960). 
Unfortunately, dividing up the gains is far from a triviality. The Coase 
Theorem assumes that parties can reach a deal without undue difficulty 
(technically, that transaction costs are low). This assumption holds in ordi-
nary markets: When you go to buy chewing gum, you encounter many sell-
ers, so if any one has drawbacks (high price or low quality), you simply 
proceed to a better supplier; symmetrically, sellers can reject undesirable 
buyers (those who demand too low a price or who complain excessively 
about quality) and wait for other purchasers. 
Anti-rent tenants and their landlords, however, did not find them-
selves in such a typical market. For a host of reasons, they were trapped into 
dealing with each other, and each other alone. This most clearly was true 
for landlords, as the lease in fee provided no way to get rid of irksome te-
nants and, more important, landlords had no cheap way to get rid of tenants 
in breach of their leases (e.g., for nonpayment of rent) . Ejectment suits were 
expensive and time-consuming. It was cheaper to strike a deal than litigate. 
In addition, replacement tenants were not easy to find. For more than a 
century, "fear of mass desertion of tenants ... constituted one of the impor-
tant deterrents to any possible despotic tendencies of landlords" (Kim 1978, 
219-20) . 
Each tenant, however, similarly was locked into relations with his 
landlord. First and foremost, the quarter sale provisions meant that they 
sacrificed 25% of the value of their farms if they decided to leave. Second, 
tenants made tract-specific improvements, such as homes, barns, and 
orchards, that they likely valued at a premium to market price. Third, they 
had family and communal ties to neighbors that they could not easily repli-
cate at a different location. Such tenants valued their farms more highly 
than most other potential bidders, making the implicit cost of leaving 
significant. 
Instead of a host of competing players, then, landlords and tenants 
were stuck with each other. The technical name for this sort of extremely 
truncated market is a bilateral monopoly. Since each side knows the other 
has no real (cost-effective) alternative, each has great incentive to engage 
in all sorts of bargaining ploys (threats to walk away; false assertions of lim-
ited wealth) to gamer the lion's share of the gains from trade between the 
parties. To make this concrete, assume that landlords would have been will-
ing to sell their rights for anything above $1 an acre, and tenants would 
have been willing to pay up to $10 an acre. This broad range of mutually 
agreeable prices creates incentives to bargain fiercely. 
Fairly concrete evidence indicates that landlords demanded excessive 
prices for their interests. The Van Rensselaers and others offered to sell 
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tenants their reversionary rights for $5 an acre. At a discount rate of 10%, 
future rents were only $2 an acre. Thus, unless the value of quarter rents was 
significantly greater than the value of rents, the landlords' demand of $5 an 
acre appears designed to gamer a big chunk of any gains from trade with 
tenants. Tenants played the same game, offering $2 an acre-not one cent 
more than the value of the rent they owed in perpetuity. 
In addition to hard bargaining, each side turned to the legal system as a 
means to gain negotiating advantages. Economist Jack Hirschleifer color-
fully labels the use of force or politics, as opposed to voluntary exchange, as 
the "dark side" of property relations (Hirschleifer 1987, 1994). A particu-
larly stark example was the tenants' successful campaign to have the state 
tax landlords' ground rents. It seems universally acknowledged that tenants 
hoped that this tax would place pressure on landlords to sell on more rea-
sonable terms (McCurdy pp. 171, 199). Note that this produced absolutely 
no direct benefit to the tenants: The tax revenue went to the state, not 
them, and indeed under their leases, they may have been liable for paying 
the tax (discussed infra). The tenants simply wielded their political power to 
impose costs on their opponents. 
The protracted and expensive anti-rent standoff suggests that each side 
underestimated the strength and determination of the other. A voiding ex-
pensive conflict is but another form of gains from trade. If both sides could 
have gazed into a crystal ball, they might likely have struck a deal splitting 
the difference in one way or another. When opponents underestimate each 
other's strength, however, they may join battle with mutual but contradic-
tory assumptions of winning quickly and easily. Perhaps the rapidly evolving 
political landscape of Jacksonian America contributed to erroneous political 
calculations. Although their influence had begun to fade, landlords were 
accustomed to significant influence in both political parties. Tenants, focus-
ing on the new tide of popular politics, may have believed that their over-
whelming numerical advantage would prevail. They underestimated the 
difficulty of forming a coalition on one issue when other issues divided pop-
ular and party interests in so many ways (e.g., internal improvements; 
banking). 
As it turned out, the two sides had rough parity of political clout; thus 
the long and expensive political warfare. McCurdy nicely sums up the anti-
rent drama as "self-defeating posturing by landlords and tenants alike. Both 
spumed compromise, both posed as noble victims deprived of their rights, 
and both blamed their unhappy fate on the corrosive interaction between 
law and politics. In 1865 nobody else cared" (McCurdy p. 336). 
Perhaps the most elegant solution offered for the root problem, bilat-
eral monopoly, was the proposal to give tenants private condemnation 
power to buy out their landlords' interests. This is a natural solution, and 
has been employed frequently under Anglo American law in cases of bilat-
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eral monopoly: roads for owners whose parcels are landlocked, land flooded 
by mill builders; and salvage fees for ships rescuing cargo and crew from 
disabled vessels (Posner 1998, 129-30). 
This remedy likely was more popular with tenants than landlords, since 
it would give them almost all the gains from trade between the parties. 
Why? At bottom, no single "correct" price exists for parties locked in a 
bilateral monopoly. Condemnation solutions, in which a court determines 
just compensation, in effect ask what the price would be if there were com-
peting sellers. Thus, buyers of private rights of way, of land to flood with a 
mill, and of salvage services at sea gamer the lion's share of the gains from 
trade. Efficiency requires only that the parties strike some deal at minimal 
transactions costs; it is agnostic about distributional issues. In this way, the 
eminent domain solution to bilateral monopoly is indeterminate and re-
quires an additional rule to divide gains from trade. Why, then, does the law 
always favor buyers? It would be equally feasible to assume that there were 
many buyers, in which case sellers would reap the gains from trade in bilat-
eral monopolies solved with private condemnation powers. Neither courts 
nor commentators, however, have offered a rationale for systematically 
favoring buyers. 
Political posturing doomed the eminent domain proposal. The political 
process served neither side well, and it probably imposed costs on nonpar-
tisans. Arguably, however, common law courts-here, as has so often been 
the case in property, contract, and tort law-settled on socially efficient 
rules. Fees on alienation were significant restraints on alienation, and such 
restraints prevent assets from flowing freely to the party best able to use 
them. Thus, the New York courts' reiteration of the common law's hostility 
to such restraints was sound social policy. Perpetual rents, however, are no 
more objectionable than perpetual taxes or perpetual association dues in 
many condos and gated communities today. There is no good economic 
reason to oppose such terms, and thus the courts' refusal to abolish perpetual 
rents likely was efficient. 
Landlord-tenant relations in the Hudson Valley illustrate a host of eco-
nomic principles not directly tied to the anti-rent movement. Perhaps most 
prominently, both McCurdy and Huston discuss facts that raise the issue of 
economic waste-individually rational but socially inefficient use of land 
and exploitation of its products. One striking example was tenants with 
two- or three-life leases who, embittered by their landlord's refusal to renew, 
"burned down their houses and threw down their fences rather than allow 
the fruits of their labor to vest in [their landlords] when their leases expired" 
(McCurdy p. 305). Such deliberate and wasteful (though possibly legal) be-
havior continued for decades after the last legal and political struggles ended 
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in the 1860s, demonstrating the depth of the bitterness tenants felt toward 
their landlords. 5 
Most cases of waste were less spectacular. Tenants extracted wood, 
plants, and stones, and they fished and hunted on lands retained by their 
landlords. Perhaps some leases gave tenants the right to enter unimproved 
tracts still owned by their landlord and to take as much forest product and 
game as they could. Other users were naked trespassers and thieves, though 
it was prohibitively expensive for landlords to monitor their thousands of 
wild frontier acres for such violations (Kim 1978, 228-29). Tenants without 
right who nonetheless entered and used the commons may have gained pre-
scriptive or customary rights. Thus, the landlords along with many tenants 
had mutual, overlapping rights in the products of the forest and streams 
referred to as "the commons." 
As with most commons, a predictable tragedy occurred: Because no 
individual could control the use of others, nobody had incentives to let trees 
grow to optimal size before harvesting, to refrain from killing does and 
younger deer, or to throw back small fish. Tenants complained that many of 
their own number loosed herds of animals into the wood, accelerating the 
process of deforestation. Many towns established rules and administrative 
bodies to police such behavior, but these measures were ineffective. Overuse 
led to shortage, and by the 1820s, many tenants were purchasing lumber lots 
from their landlords to gain undisputed control over the trees necessary for 
fuel and construction. This is another example of Demsetz's thesis that 
property rights tend to emerge when growing scarcity makes the creation of 
property rights worthwhile (Demsetz 1967). According to McCurdy, 
smarter tenants figured out the economics of waste and turned it to their 
advantage. They "mined the soil, saved their money, sold out to newcomers, 
and joined the procession into the new west" (McCurdy p. 12). 
A second ancillary economic issue arises from the parties' posturing on 
the taxation of the ground rents paid to landlords, and it demonstrates the 
economic sophistication of contemporary analysts. Representatives of city 
landlords, whose leases had very short terms (e.g., a year), argued that im-
posing the tax on them would only hurt urban tenants, as the landlords 
would pass on the tax in the form of higher rent. As for the Hudson Valley 
landlords, it is initially puzzling why they opposed the tax, as most of their 
leases required tenants to pay all taxes on the land they leased. Yet both 
5. It is unclear whether tenants burning improvements that they had made amounted to 
legal waste; it certainly would have been waste to burn premises provided by the landlord. 
Note that tenants must have derived significant utility from burning their houses at the end of 
their term. As long as it was legal, they could have threatened landlords that they would do 
so, and have extracted at least part of the value of their improvements as a payment for not 
burning their buildings. This is yet another aspect of the bilateral monopoly berween the 
tenants and landlords. The rules of waste are simply defaults, of course, and the parties could 
have contracted for different rules in the leases. 
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Stephen and William van Rensselaer (unsuccessfully) challenged the tax in 
court. Transaction cost economics provides the answer. The law imposed 
the tax on the landlords, and so the government refused to look to tenants 
for payment. The costs to landlords of collecting the small sums due from 
each of hundreds or thousands of tenants exceeded the aggregate tax bill, 
and thus, as a practical matter, the tax fell on landlords. 
In the end, economics may be unsatisfying as an explanation for the 
behavior of those tenants and landlords who never settled with each other. 
Bilateral monopolies are fairly common, and rarely do the bargaining games 
played by the parties reach such a fevered pitch. Part of the story, without 
doubt, was the sheer number of tenants and landlords: Statistics suggest that 
some pairings would consist of mutually stubborn parties. The large amounts 
at stake encouraged posturing. 
In addition, the intensity of the felt injustice of perpetual (or multi-
lives) rent seems to have played a role. This takes us beyond economics, 
where preferences are taken as fixed parameters, and into the realm of psy-
chology and the formation of preferences in the first place. A French trav-
eler, the Duke of La Rochefoudcauld-Liancourt, who visited New York in 
1795, may have pinpointed the dissatisfaction brewing two generations 
before the anti-rent movement. "A man, who is obliged to pay every year a 
groundrent, soon forgets the moderate terms on which he obtained posses-
sion of his estate, feels only the unpleasant compulsion of paying money at a 
fixed time, and eagerly seizes upon the first opportunity of freeing himself 
from his encumbrance" (Kim 1978, 187, quoting Munselll850-59, 4:238). 
VI. ENDURING LESSONS 
In his last paragraph, McCurdy sums up the failures of law, politics, and 
ideology in dealing with the anti-rent movement, and warns that "[w]e for-
get them at our peril." Society's inability to ameliorate the deeply felt injus-
tice of "rent forever" does indeed invite study so that we do not repeat past 
errors. Exactly what lessons politicians, lawyers, judges, and ideologues 
should draw from the anti-rent movement, however, is unclear. Perhaps pri-
vate parties can learn a more definite lesson: Settling for half the pie likely 
is preferable to destroying most of the pie in a bare-knuckled brawl. 
Two specific issues raised in the anti-rent movement surprisingly re-
main contentious today, almost a century and a half later. First, private 
powers of condemnation continue to trouble courts, as reflected in relatively 
frequent litigation over the meaning of the "public use" requirement in state 
takings clauses. Generally, the Supreme Court has defined the term expan-
sively as a matter of federal law. Nothing better illustrates this proposition 
than Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984), a case with facts strikingly 
similar to those of the anti-rent movement. A handful of landlords held title 
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to almost half of all privately owned realty in the state of Hawaii. It was 
difficult, then, for many Hawaiians to become owners as opposed to tenants. 
The state legislature decided that this was socially undesirable for a host of 
reasons, including the usual economic problems with tenancies. Their ratio-
nales are strikingly similar to those advanced by William Duer, architect of 
the eminent domain proposal in the anti-rent movement. Hawaii, unlike 
New York, enacted an eminent domain scheme enabling tenants to buy out 
their landlords at prices determined by negotiation or by courts in formal 
condemnation suits. In sweeping language, a unanimous Court reversed a 
decision barring such condemnations and defined the class of public uses as 
all encompassing. 
This, however, has not proved to be the end of the story. A number of 
state courts have interpreted their state public use requirements less permis-
sively. Only last year, the Washington Supreme Court in effect rejected 
Midkiff and struck down a statute giving mobile home tenants a right of first 
refusal to purchase the land under their homes if and when landlords put 
the land up for sale (Manufactured Housing Communities v. State 2000). The 
court said that under the state of Washington's version of the public use 
requirement, this measure benefited only the private interests of mobile 
home owners. An earlier Washington decision struck down an urban re-
newal program that would have authorized the use of condemnation to 
transfer land from existing owners to private parties opening businesses in 
blighted areas (In re Seattle 1981). This again rejects more permissive federal 
case law (Berman v. Parker 1954). 
Washington is not alone. The Michigan Supreme Court struck down a 
city ordinance giving a cable television provider the power to condemn 
easements and other property interests to assure service to apartment dwell-
ers, finding that the private interests served predominated over any public 
uses (Lansing v. Edward Rose Realty 1992). A Montana court set aside the 
condemnation of property for a local chamber of commerce because that 
portion of the project did not serve a public purpose (Chamber of Commerce 
v. Vaniman 1995). And just last year, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
declared that it would strike down any condemnation where the primary 
purpose was not for a public use (HTA Limited Partnership v. Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority 2001). Recent case law by no means uniformly reads pub-
lic use requirements strictly; in the famous Poletown Neighborhood Council v . 
Detroit (1981), the Michigan Supreme Court permitted the city of Detroit 
to condemn an entire neighborhood and tum it over to General Motors. 
The same court, however, explicitly declined to reverse this holding in Lan-
sing v. Edward Rose Realty. The point is that state courts, like anti-rent law-
yers, continue to wrestle with the extent to which the state can assist 
private parties with its power to condemn property. 
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Private powers of condemnation offer a middle ground in bilateral mo-
nopolies and other property disputes, forcing a transaction on an unwilling 
seller, yet requiring the buyer to pay a price determined fair by a disinter-
ested court. In some states, however, the protection of property rights in 
effect trumps the benefits offered by private condemnation, and courts re-
fuse to force the sale of private party A's property to private party B. 
Perhaps even more surprising than the continued vitality of this limita-
tion on private powers of condemnation is the ongoing use of fees on aliena-
tion in private agreements. Although the reservation of such fees in the sale 
of a fee interest is probably per se invalid in all states as a direct restraint on 
alienation, transactors find them irresistible and have found other ways to 
introduce them. Shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs) are one recently 
developed example. In a SAM, the borrower receives a lower interest rate 
on her mortgage in return for sharing some percent (usually from 30% to 
60%) of any appreciation in the value of the property when eventually sold. 
Although different in form from the quarter sales in leases in fee, which 
required tenants to share 25% of the total price instead of just the increase 
in price, in substance they are quite similar. The lender, like the landlord, 
shares in part of the proceeds at sale. If we ever again experience significant 
inflation, SAM borrowers may find these terms as onerous as tenants found 
quarter sales and similar fines on alienation. 
Another example of fees due on alienation comes from Co-op Village, 
a very successful cooperative housing complex in lower Manhattan, devel-
oped by unions and occupied by their members under terms giving the co-
operative rights to repurchase units at a little over the seller's cost. As the 
value of the units has skyrocketed in recent decades, some occupants began 
clamoring for the right to sell their interest at market prices. Other tenants, 
feeling that such free-market transfers conflict with the communitarian 
ethic that motivated the construction of the complex in the first place, 
proposed that, if sales are allowed, the sellers should share one-fourth of the 
appreciation in the value of their unit (New York Times 1996). Eerily, this is 
precisely the fraction in the quarter rents commonly found in the leases in 
fee . In New York City today, down the Hudson River from the battleground 
of the anti-rent movement, then, a spirit of populism diametrically at odds 
with patroonery led to a proposal to use a despised tool of the mighty land-
lords to protect communitarian values from profiteering. Every dog has its 
day; creative minds have turned aristocratic restraints on alienation to pop-
ulist ends. 
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